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Introduction 
 
China has experienced sustained economic growth of more than 9% per 
annum during 1978-2005—a record that surpassed even the miraculous growth rate of 
the group of four East Asian economies in the 1970s and 80s. What is even more 
striking is that this sustained growth was, at least until the late 1990s, achieved in 
large part under predominantly public ownership with the township-and-village 
enterprises (hereafter TVEs) being the most notable organizational form under the 
purview of subnational governments.2 Regional decentralization, which drives 
regional competition or specifically “yardstick jurisdictional competition” and 
regional experiments, has been a principal force underpinning China’s unorthodox 
growth experience (Xu, 2009). Specifically, “yardstick jurisdictional competition” 
refers to a process that relies on regions facing similar external economic environment 
to compete with one another on a (more or less) equal footing in a decentralized and 
non-specialized environment (Maskin, Qian and Xu, 2000).  At an earlier stage, and 
as part and parcel of China’s reform strategy based upon regional decentralization, the 
central state adopted the specific strategy of fiscal decentralization in the early 1980s. 
By assigning residual tax claiming rights to various levels of local governments, this 
fiscal measure empowered them with positive inducements to promote local economic 
growth (Oi, 1999). Thus, despite the notable absence of private property rights, these 
regional decentralization-based reforms led to sustained local economic growth. 
 
In this chapter we investigate how the powerful incentive of fiscal stimulus 
has induced local governments to switch their development focus from industrializing 
their jurisdictions to urbanizing them, as articulated in the eventual demise of TVEs 
after its phenomenal rise, followed by the boom (and recently bust) of a real estate 
sector in recent years. Determined to enhance “state capacity”, the central state 
attenuated the claims of local governments over tax revenues generated by their non-
state, non-private enterprises; the 1994 fiscal recentralization reduced the share of 
local governments’ entitlement to an important tax source, namely value-added or 
transaction tax by a substantial 75%. In order to compensate local governments for the 
losses thus resulted, local governments were assigned greater control rights over 
                                                 
2 While the term is usually referred to the provincial level and below, in this paper we are mostly 
concerned with the economic behavior of lower-level government authorities spanning the municipal 
and township authorities.  
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revenues generated, initially, by local state firms, followed by land sales; to the extent 
that the overall regional decentralization strategy which underpinned economic 
growth has  not been weakened by this particular fiscal recentralization measure.  In 
fact, the incentives of local governments in promoting rural industrialization had 
remained unchanged up to this stage of the reform. It was only until the central state 
further reduced the local governments’ share in enterprise profit tax—also by a 
substantial 60% in 2002—did the latter find it no longer profitable to continue to run 
industrial enterprises that were barely profitable. It was then that many local 
governments began to pursue the alternative strategy of “urbanization”. 
 
Why are local governments interested in urbanizing their localities, more 
importantly, how do they benefit from such a process, and with what consequences? 
In the context of a highly decentralized control rights (both de jure and de facto) over 
local resources—including land, fiscal revenue incentives provide an important clue 
to addressing these questions.  Specifically, while the central government has since 
1994 reclaimed a substantial share of the tax revenues generated by TVEs and 
subsequently all industrial enterprises regardless of ownership, local governments 
have been assigned the exclusive right over an increasingly important tax category, 
viz. the business tax. This tax has been a driving force in China’s urbanization process, 
as nearly half of these revenues are generated from the construction and real estate 
sectors. In addition, since urbanization helps spur local GDP growth, it also enhances 
the career prospects of local officials (Xu, 2009).  
 
Indeed, evidence does show that business tax has replaced both value-added 
and enterprise profit taxes as a new source of local governments’ budgetary revenues. 
However, it is the monopoly right that the central state assigned to local governments 
over the conversion of farmland to non-arable usages that has powerfully whetted the 
local governments’ fiscal appetite. Blessed with escalating land prices (especially for 
commercial and real estate developments in premium locations) on the one hand and 
artificially low compensations (based on the value of agricultural land use) on the 
other, many local governments—especially those in the rapidly developing coastal 
areas—have pocketed “windfall profits” from this state-induced urbanization process. 
As with the wide array of fees that users of converted farmland are made to pay to 
local governments and kept under the “extra-budgetary” or unsupervised category, 
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land conversion income or the market price of land that developers pay for its use is 
similarly unsupervised. Evidence further suggests that land conversion income 
constitutes the biggest source of unregulated and unshared revenue for many local 
governments.  
   
 As with the effect of fiscal decentralization on the explosive growth of TVEs 
in the 1980s, the strong fiscal incentives provided by the 1994 reforms have led to two 
social problems; bearing in mind that fiscal decentralization is part of regional 
decentralization and that local governments are able to control enormous amount of 
resources within their jurisdictions. The first is that this “land-revenue incentive” has 
predisposed local governments to engage in farmland conversion at rates that not only 
endanger China’s stock of arable land, but also subject large majorities of farmers to 
losing their primary source of livelihood with minimal compensation. And that is 
because, despite their being the nominal owner, the prevailing compensation principle 
as designed by the central government somehow confines farmers’ rights in land to 
basically an “agrarian” usage; once land use is changed and ownership converted 
(from collective to state), these “agrarian rights” cease to exist. In other words, 
farmers would only be compensated according to the value of crop production, which 
is meager in comparison to what the local governments would obtain in selling these 
converted rights, in particular if the latter are based on commercial and real estate 
usage. Clearly, the Chinese government needs to address the twin problems of 
protecting farmers’ property rights as well as halting the unabated loss of arable land 
in its reforms ahead.       
 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we 
provide a descriptive analysis of “regional decentralization authoritarianism” as a 
general context for understanding China’s reform strategy (Section 2), followed by a 
brief discussion of the fiscal contracting system and the powerful incentive effects it 
has had on local officials in developing the non-state local economy (in particular the 
TVEs), in Section 3. In Section 4 we show the connection between fiscal 
recentralization and the demise of TVEs and subsequently also the waning interest of 
local governments in promoting enterprise growth, whereas Section 5 examines the 
new set of incentives that powerfully set the local states to keenly engage in hastening 
urbanization or specifically land conversion. Section 6 then looks into the problems of 
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this urbanization strategy both from a resource-erosion (of farmland) standpoint but 
more so from the perspective concerning the violation of farmers’ property rights. 
Section 7 provides a brief conclusion. 
 
 
Regional decentralization authoritarianism 
 
In sharp contrast to all other formerly centralized economies where 
specialization and monopoly is an outstanding feature China had never organized its 
economy in a highly centralized manner—even in its heyday as a command economy 
(Naughton, 2007). This may explain why, when reforms commenced in China the 
number of products directly under the central plan was a mere 791—compared with 
over 12 million in the former Soviet Union, and the number of ministries directly 
under the central government’s control less than 30—compared with 62 in the Soviet 
in the late 1970s (Xu, 2009). By further devolving the responsibilities of developing 
the local economies to regional governments the “Chinese-style” economic reforms 
only deepened this long-embedded decentralizing proclivity (Shirk, 1993). Consisting 
of a region-based multi-level hierarchy, in 2005 the central government directly 
controlled less than 4% of all industrial employees nationwide—already the largest 
economic sector in which it has had direct involvement.  
 
An overriding goal of economic reforms is to improve economic efficiency, 
and the key to achieving that is to invigorate competition. The Chinese state achieved 
that important goal via regional decentralization, which essentially consists of two 
core elements. The first is, given its “initial conditions” (of being already highly 
decentralized) the state devolved property rights to various levels of regional 
governments to directly set up and manage enterprises of varying ownership types 
appropriate to their levels, and have them compete with each other on a regional basis. 
Secondly, equally important is that regional governments were provided with strong 
incentives to develop their economies via enterprise competition. In addition to 
granting these local governments de facto property rights over both (the smaller) 
state-owned and collectively-owned enterprises, which accounted for the majority of 
enterprises in China, the state has effectively put into place a “nested” system of 
personnel control by which to reward officials who have proven track records of 
moving their economies forward with promotion (and “rotation” in some instances). 
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More specifically, this “developmental” incentive was further invigorated by the 
adoption of a “fiscal contracting” system whereby local governments were entitled to 
retain that portion of the revenue in excess of the remitted amount that it negotiated 
with the central government;3 a system with incentive properties analogous to that of 
a “fixed rental” system and which therefore has the effect of encouraging the 
“tenant”—the local government—to seek more revenues (more below).   
 
But decentralization does not always create strong incentives to regional 
officials for regional economic growth, hence the intriguing question is what makes 
China special in providing strong incentives to regional officials for economic 
development, and is there empirical evidence to bear upon the effectiveness of a 
basically decentralized regional economic operations nested within a hierarchy of 
centralized personnel control. Below we provide some clues to these related questions.   
 
For regional decentralization and competition to work the center must be able 
to observe the true effort of regional officials—a dauntingly formidable task given 
that typically information is “impacted” within regions (Williamson, 1985). While the 
principal is unable to observe effort, fortunately outcome can be observed. 
Specifically, competition between regional officials can be evaluated among regions 
of comparable levels of development through a ranking system that resembles a 
tournament competition; which, as economic theory shows, is an effective mechanism 
for differentiating effort and accordingly performance. But two conditions must be 
met in order for a regional tournament competition to be feasible. First, the central 
government must be able to eradicate collusion between local or regional 
governments because collusion among regional officials could destroy competition. 
Fortunately, this condition is made possible by the fact that Chinese regions—
especially those at the county levels—are relatively self-sufficient and non-
specialized. To the extent that each region contains multiple economic sectors, it 
weakens interdependence between regions, as it enables local governments to carry 
out and coordinate most economic activities within their own jurisdictions.  
                                                 
3 Jean Oi (1999) describes this revenue-sharing fiscal contracting system most succinctly: “Revenue 
sharing is a process in which local governments down to the level of township have the responsibility 
for collecting all nationally set taxes and then turning over a portion of this revenue to the next higher 
level. Those who have increased their tax revenues are allowed to keep the major portion of the 
increase. The provisions of revenue sharing are formalized in fiscal contracts between the central state 
and each of its provinces, between each province and its prefectures, between each prefecture and its 
counties, and between each county and its township.” (p. 29) 
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Secondly, for regional tournament competition to work, it is also important 
that each region and the industrial sectors contained therein face broadly similar 
exogenous conditions, as that permits the center to compare the relative performance 
of regions—a more accurate and relevant yardstick for evaluating actual 
performance.4 Based on data that contains industry classification codes and location 
codes for each firm, Maskin, Qian and Xu (2000) find that the Chinese regions are 
indeed “alike”; their empirical results suggest that regional tournaments do work 
better than the alternative “ministerial” tournaments—one that resembles the highly 
specialized and monopolistic features of the formerly centrally planned economy—in 
providing high-powered incentives to local officials. Similarly, using data covering 
344 top provincial officials for the 1979-2002 period, Chen, Li and Zhou (2005) find 
that each official’s performance relative to her immediate predecessor does have a 
significant impact on her promotion. Using a panel dataset that covers 254 provincial 
leaders who had served in 28 Chinese provinces from 1979 to 1995, Li and Zhou 
(2005) similarly show that regional officials were indeed strongly motivated to 
promote regional economic growth. Specifically, a higher GDP growth rate in a 
province significantly improves the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders—a 
result that underscores the underlying assumption that the central government makes 
promotion or turnover decisions based on a performance score of these leaders. 
 
 That there exists an intimate relationship between the performance of regional 
officials and their career prospects is indeed well documented in a number of studies. 
Tsui and Wang (2004), for instance, show that 60% of the targets required of leading 
provincial officials are related to “economic construction”. Moreover, the lower the 
level of regional governments the more concrete the stipulated targets become (Edin, 
2003). At the lowest administrative levels, viz. the township and village levels, party 
secretaries and township heads are required to fulfill three categories of performance 
targets, with the fulfillment of the “hard” targets (consisting specifically of economic 
development plans most notably per capita GDP growth and tax revenues quotas) tied 
intimately to the award of bonuses and promotion (or political rewards) (Whiting, 
2000). At the county level, for instance, Edin (2003) has observed that top-ranking 
                                                 
4 For example, even if the tasks of agents are similar but if outside random factors that agents face do 
not follow the same distribution the principal would be unable to compare the performance of one 
agent with that of the other even if the absolute performance of both can be observed.  
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township officials have been promoted to positions at the county level, whereas well 
performed municipal officials even transferred to other provinces as governors (Xu et 
al., 2007). In this context, an important question is whether the incentive embedded in 
this kind of “yardstick competition” serves the intended purpose of spurring regional 
economic growth. Before answering this question it is important that we include in 
our discussion the unique importance of fiscal decentralization—a core element of 
regional decentralization—in China’s reform process. 
 
 
Fiscal revenue incentive and the rise of TVEs 
 
 The “career incentive” embedded in the kind of regional decentralization 
authoritarianism outlined above explains the powerful incentives bestowed upon 
regional governments in developing the economies under their jurisdictions. Growth 
of per capita GDP, employment and tax revenues, among other performance 
indicators are the important metrics upon which their careers within the Party and the 
government crucially depend. Another important part and parcel of the regional 
decentralization strategy was fiscal decentralization. The fiscal reforms implemented 
in the 1980s dramatically changed the incentives for local governments. By ceasing to 
guarantee upper-level budget allocations to meet local expenditures, local 
governments had to rely primarily on revenues created within their own jurisdictions. 
They were granted control rights over both revenues and profits generated by these 
endeavors. An important part of the revenue came from the development of non-farm 
enterprises (Qian and Xu, 1993; Oi, 1999). This shared arrangement of fiscal revenues 
between two immediate levels of government has had the essential incentive property 
of a “fixed rental” contract, whereby the “tenant” gets to keep more the more 
revenues it manages to generate.5    
 
 As part of regional decentralization, fiscal decentralization played an 
important role in the massive and rapid development of a non-state sector in the 
Chinese economy since around the mid-1980s, of which township and village 
                                                 
5 Oi (1999) notes that the terms of the contracts vary from one place to another; while some areas 
employ an overall ratio such as 70:30 (with the level of government from which the taxes are collected 
keeps 70% whereas the immediate supervising level keeps 30%), others merely pay a fixed lump-sum 
quota to the next higher level (p. 29). “Regardless of the system of revenue sharing in effect, increased 
tax collection guarantees a locality an increase in tax revenue” (Oi, 1999: 30). 
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enterprises (hereafter TVEs) was a key component (Qian and Xu, 1993; Jin, Qian and 
Weingast, 2005).  Indeed, with no more than a modicum of non-agricultural 
enterprises before the early 1980s TVEs already counted for roughly 80% of output of 
the non-state sector in less than a decade. Between 1981 and 1990, total industrial 
output of TVEs grew at an average rate of 28%, and as such had been the main engine 
of growth of the Chinese economy. It is also well known that the productivity of 
TVEs was distinctly higher than that of the SOEs (Weitzman and Xu, 1994). 
 
 County governments benefited enormously from the development of TVEs, 
primarily because they were able to share tax revenues that these enterprises 
generated under the fiscal contracting arrangement and that the lion’s share of the 
increases in tax revenues (the industrial-commercial taxes) had come primarily from 
township and village enterprises. Starting at a modest base of a little over 2 billion 
yuan in 1978, taxes grew to 205.8 billion yuan by 1995—an increase of more than 
tenfold (Oi, 1999: 36).6 As long as the variety of taxes that county-level governments 
were able to capture was based on production (product tax), income (value-added or 
transaction tax), and turnover (business tax) rather than profits per se, it had powerful 
incentives to expand TVEs without paying much regard to their profitability.  
 
A similar incentive existed for the township governments. Not only were they 
entitled to sharing the bulk of tax revenues (e.g. 70%), they were also keeper of 
enterprise income or simply profit tax, which formed an additional source of 
“horizontal” income essential for, among other purposes financing the provision of 
local public goods.7 Depending on the level of tax revenues, local governments 
needed not exert the same amount of effort in collecting taxes. By taxing at the 
minimum rather than maximum levels, which is viable in a context where the 
economy was still growing, some local governments may decide to provide greater 
incentives for enterprises under their jurisdiction to become more efficient.8 
 
                                                 
6 Although county-level industrial firms continued to be the bedrock of county-level income and taxes, 
its tax contribution had decreased as a proportion of total revenues over time as TVEs grew (Wong, 
1991; Naughton, 1992). 
7 In 1985 enterprise income tax was extended to township and village enterprises in replacing the 
industrial-commercial income tax (see Oi, 1999: 35). 
8 Oi (1999), for instance, has found that rich counties tended to grant more tax breaks than did poor 
counties (p. 38). 
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In addition to reaping the direct benefits of increased fiscal revenues, the 
development of TVEs also had the anticipated effect of accelerating GDP growth, 
which in turn served to enhance local officials’ career prospects (Xu, 2009). Thus, 
local officials had been keen in developing the TVEs, such as by procuring loans from 
financial institutions under their jurisdiction to finance their expansion. In 1995, for 
example, bank loans accounted for as much as 64% of all credit incurred by TVEs; 
more startlingly, overall debt-equity ratio of TVEs even outweighed that of the SOEs 
(Kung and Lin, 2007: 573). In fact, even up until 1999, when some provinces already 
underwent large scale privatizations of  TVEs, TVEs continued to achieve steady 
growth in tax revenue; only the “efficiency” of tax revenues—that is, tax revenues 
measured in terms of per unit of sales and profits—declined (more below on this). 
   
 
1994 Fiscal Reform and the Decline of TVEs 
 
 By the 1990s concerns had mounted that the reform strategy of allowing 
localities to benefit disproportionately from local economic growth by assigning the 
regional governments residual income rights over tax revenues and enterprise profits 
was achieved at considerable costs; to the extent that the “central state capacity” had 
been severely weakened. For instance, the central government’s share of revenue in 
overall budgetary revenue dwindled precipitously from 40.5% in 1984 to 22% in 1993. 
Some  scholars even contend that the state had, as a result of fiscal decentralization 
lost its capacity to macro-manage the economy, which may in turn led to political 
instability (e.g., Wang and Hu, 1993; 2001). Responding to this concern, the state 
tightened fiscal control over revenues in 1994 by redefining tax rights between the 
national and regional governments and took more in taxes from the localities. By 
reclassifying tax categories and assigning tax rights based not on who owns an 
enterprise, the ensuing reforms essentially subjected a disproportionately larger 
revenue to revenue sharing. In particular, the central government wrestled from local 
governments the exclusive rights over a newly established consumption tax over such 
inelastic consumption products as beer, hard liquor and cigarettes, as well as 
reassigned a hefty 75% of the transaction or value-added tax to itself. As Fig. 1 
clearly shows, this measure drastically altered the proportion of revenues shared 
between the national and sub-national governments. For the latter, the ratio 
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plummeted from an apex of 80% before 1994 to roughly 45% afterwards and became 
stabilized at that level thereafter.  
 
Fig. 1 about here 
 
While the central government has since the 1994 fiscal reform reclaimed a 
substantial share of the tax revenues generated from TVEs and other industrial 
enterprises, local governments were compensated by gaining other rights in the 
process. Specifically, they were assigned the exclusive right over what is to become 
an increasingly important tax category, viz. the business tax. Moreover, local 
governments were given the official recognition for being the de jure owner of not 
merely the enterprises established under their jurisdiction but more importantly also 
of land (the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 1997; Xu, 
2009); which for some is going to be an enormously important revenue source. As we 
shall soon demonstrate, the rights with which the central state assigned to the local 
governments both in the disposal of local firms but more so in the conversion of 
farmland to non-arable usages have crucially shaped the incentives and accordingly 
behavior of the local governments in the post-TVEs era.  
 
The implications of the fiscal reform package on local finances and on the 
development strategy of local governments are profoundly far reaching. Here we 
confine our analysis to the eventual demise of TVEs—once an engine of growth of 
China’s economy during the first twenty years or so of the reform. As rehearsed 
earlier, local officials at both the county and township levels had especially strong 
incentives to expand TVEs because of the (transaction) tax revenues that these 
enterprises remitted and their career concerns. These advantages were however short-
lived; once the central state began to expropriate the lion’s share of the tax revenues 
associated with TVEs local governments were no longer as enthusiastic in their 
expansion and from then onwards the entire TVE sector began to decline (Kung and 
Lin, 2007). 
 
Decline of the TVE sector is attributable in particular to both a reduction of 
investments in, and privatization of the sector. The reasons behind the reduction of 
investments and privatization were variegated; here we focus primarily on the impact 
 11
of the 1994 fiscal reforms.9 Indeed, despite a secular rise in TVE tax revenues, “tax 
“efficiency” of the TVE sector —measured in terms of tax revenue per unit of sales 
and profit rate—had in fact declined over time. This is due to a weakening in the local 
officials’ monitoring capacity and their growing inability to obtain credit to help 
finance TVEs expansion. Nationwide evidence indicates that as a result the relative 
importance of TVEs declined (Kung and Lin, 2007). 
 
 The 1994 fiscal reform was one of the major factors that further pushed the 
nationwide privatization of TVEs. In light of the drastic shift in fiscal rights between 
the national and sub-national governments over particularly the transaction tax (from 
fully 100% before 1994 to only 25% thereafter), it is most likely that the benefits of 
TVEs expansion at the margin would decline precipitously, whereas the costs of 
expansion—in terms of obtaining loans and maintaining profits—would increase 
markedly. Given other factors, this may further convince local governments to 
privatize TVEs. The statistical significance of a negative coefficient of time trend in 
Kung and Lin’s (2007) estimations may be interpreted as capturing this secular trend 
of privatization triggered by the change exogenously imposed by  the 1994 fiscal 
reforms.  
 
 
From Industrialization to Urbanization—A new source of fiscal revenue incentive 
 
 In market economies industrialization and urbanization usually go hand in 
hand with each other. The case in China, however, is somewhat different. Owing to 
restrictions that the Chinese government has placed upon rural-urban migration (since 
around the mid-1950s), the two processes have been made artificially separate. This is 
especially the case before the 1978 economic reforms, when industrial growth was 
spatially concentrated in urban areas, on the one hand, and rural-urban migration held 
tightly in check—via the household registration system or hukou—on the other. 
Although the physical movement of people have been greatly relaxed in the last 
quarter of century and urbanization has since then proceeded at a much faster clip 
than previously, as over hundreds of millions of villagers have migrated to the urban 
                                                 
9 The existing literature predicts that when the protection of private property rights has improved, when 
asset markets are better developed, and/or when large-scale migration has occurred, the ownership 
advantage of TVEs tends to become sub-optimal and privatization is more likely to occur. Evidences 
are consistent with these predictions (Xu, 2009). 
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areas to take advantage of the non-farm employment opportunities, the hukou 
system—essentially an “apartheid” institution that separates the urban populace from 
its rural counterpart via the rights to a wide range of “entitlements” (such as the rights 
of their children to education for instance)—remains restrictive in many respects. 
Moreover, a case can also be made that urbanization has been slowed also by the fact 
that a good part of China’s post-reform industrial growth has spatially concentrated in 
townships and villages. While the reassignment of rights over transaction or value-
added taxes undoubtedly led the local governments to shed a large collection of non-
private enterprises many of which were likely unprofitable, the 1994 fiscal reforms 
did not stifle rural industrialization, as local authorities were still left with exclusive 
claims over enterprise income or profit tax, and which therefore rendered them to 
focus parsimoniously on enterprise efficiency. It is thus no coincidence that the 
privatization of TVEs, which began in earnest around 1995, had merely led to a 
change in ownership rather than elimination of many of these industrial enterprises. 
 
 What made local governments shift their development strategy from fostering 
enterprise growth to that of urban growth was the reassignment of rights over 
enterprise profit tax in 2002. The 1994 fiscal reforms left both local enterprise income 
tax and individual income tax (alongside a number of other tax categories) to the local 
governments as sole residual claimants (Oi, 1999: 55). Similar in spirit to the 1994 
reforms, the central government proposed to appropriate, from 2002 onwards 50% of 
the enterprise profit tax (increased to 60% in 2003)—a change with the effect of 
robbing local governments the incentive of improving enterprise efficiency regardless 
of ownership. To make up for the lost revenues resulting from these fiscal reforms 
local governments must look elsewhere. Fortunately for the local governments the 
central state has not proposed to share with them what is to become an important 
source of tax revenue, namely the business tax, which consists primarily of taxes 
levied upon the construction and real estate industry and to a lesser extent also the 
service sector. As the Chinese economy continues to grow and so the country is 
concomitantly going through a secular process of urbanization, construction and real 
estate development has become the cornerstone of this development process, to the 
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extent that it profitably provides a new source of tax revenue to local authorities, who, 
needless to say are only all too happy to ride on this emerging wave.10  
 
The changing relative importance of these two taxes in overall budgetary 
revenues of local (county-level) governments is reflected in the growing share of 
business tax from 20% in 1994 to 25% in 2003, on the one hand, and the decline of 
transaction tax from 22% to 18% during the same period on the other (Zhou, 2006: 
112). As shown in Figure 2, the construction and real estate (CRE) sectors have been 
a major contributing source of business tax revenue. Moreover, its relative importance 
had increased over time—from 33% in 2001 to almost one half, 45.5%, in 2004.  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, that one of us found, in an in-depth study of local finance in a 
rapidly developing county in Zhejiang—a province located in the eastern coastal 
seaboard—that business taxes collected from the CRE sector accounted for 17% of 
the land-and-construction related budgetary revenues, which in turn accounted for 
nearly 40% of total budgetary revenues (38.4% of roughly 12 million yuan, Figure 3, 
Zhou, 2007). Against this background, it becomes apparent that as much as 17.6% of 
the farmland loss (due to conversion) between 2000 and 2005 was occupied by 
construction for a variety of purposes, with the magnitude rising over time (more than 
half, 58.7%, of the farmland converted in 2005 was earmarked for construction, 
Ministry of Land and Resources, 2006). The recentralization of fiscal rights since 
1994 notwithstanding, the reforms in question has unwittingly left a “tail” for local 
governments to engage in a gamut of construction and infrastructure projects in 
China’s accelerating urbanization process. But it is land development or specifically 
the conversion of farmland to non-arable usage that provides local governments with 
even more powerful incentives to “urbanize” China. 
   
Figs. 2 and 3 about here 
 
The benefit of pursuing an “urbanization” strategy is by no means confined to 
being the sole residual claimant of the business tax. By converting farmland for a 
variety of development projects local governments are able to both collect fees (fei) 
associated with land conversion and, even more lucratively entitle to a land 
conversion income (tudi churang jin)—an income stream over which it has been 
                                                 
10 The percentage of the Chinese population classified as “urban”—those residing in township and 
above—increased from less than 18% in 1978 to 43% in 2006 (State Statistical Bureau of China, 2007). 
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assigned exclusive rights by the central government (more below). As fees are 
classified as “extra-budgetary” revenues, local governments are allowed to lay 
exclusive claims over this income source, which as we can see from Figure 3 
amounted to over half (51.5%) of the surveyed county’s overall “extra-budgetary” 
revenues in 2003. For rapidly developing counties that command a price premium on 
their locations, these “extra-budgetary” land revenues can indeed be substantial, and 
which must have usefully substituted for the loss revenues which have been channeled 
to the central government as a result of the 1994 and (perhaps to a lesser extent) also 
the 2002 fiscal reforms. 
 
But the biggest gain of all from converting collective farmland into non-arable 
usages comes distinctly from land conversion income—a revenue stream to which 
local governments have been assigned exclusive rights—also commencing 1994.11 
Although conversion of cultivated land for urban and rural construction can be dated 
to the late 1980s, thanks initially to the rural housing construction boom and 
subsequently to industrial, transport and urban developments, the magnitude of 
revenues was miniscule back then. For instance, the amount of fees collected from 
land leasing totaled only 242 billion yuan nationwide between 1987 and 1994 (State 
Land Management Bureau, 1998, cited in Lin and Ho, 2005), which pales greatly in 
comparison with the 901 billion yuan or 90% of the entire revenue received during the 
three years between 2001 and 2003.  
 
That the acceleration of land conversion is a recent phenomenon can be clearly 
illustrated in Figure 4, where we plot both the incidence and magnitude of land 
conversion for the period 1993-2005 from figures provided by the Ministry of Land 
and Resources. There we can see that it is only after 1999 did both the incidence and 
magnitude exhibit a steeply upward trend, up until 2003 when the state became so 
worried that China would soon deplete its arable land below its lowest threshold 
required of food self-sufficiency that it began to clamp down on the “excessiveness” 
                                                 
11 It was first introduced in 1989 as a shared arrangement between the central and regional governments 
under the provisional regulation “Temporary regulation on the transfer of use rights of state-owned 
land in towns and cities”. When it was amended in 1994, the state allowed regional governments to 
appropriate in full the proceeds from transferring the use rights of state-owned land. 
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of land conversion, at a time when land prices—especially those in premier 
locations—already commanded hefty valuations (more on this below).12  
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
In an attempt to slow down the conversion of farmland by regional 
governments, the Ministry of Land and Resources set a quota on the maximum 
quantity of land authorized for conversion in a policy document in 2001, beyond 
which limit it would be considered illegal. But if Zhou’s (2007) micro-study 
realistically approximates the reality, the incredibly colossal magnitude of “land 
conversion fee” received by governments in the rapidly developing counties (that it 
could be as large as the budgetary and “extra-budgetary” revenues combined) implies 
that it would not be an easy task for the central government to effectively put a brake 
on land conversion. The fact that regional governments have been assigned monopoly 
rights to receive this lucrative, unregulated income source in its entirety must have 
powerfully whetted the fiscal appetite of regional officials in hastening the pace of 
land conversion.  
 
 This may help explain why, even though authorized (or “legal”) land 
conversion activities declined since 2003, un-authorized (or “illegal”) ones had 
sharply risen during the same year; this is especially so with regard to land area 
(Figure 5). Escalating land prices—especially those in premier locations, on the one 
hand, and the low costs of land compensation, on the other, were the likely culprits. 
The prices of land in premier locations have likely appreciated by leaps and bounds in 
recent years that, for instance eight premier sites in the municipality of Hangzhou 
were expected to fetch 6 billion yuan from the cash-flushed domestic developers 
(SCMP, August 15, 2007, p. 3). Such lucrative revenues have to be set against the 
exceedingly low costs of land conversion incurred by regional governments—subject 
of our next section. For instance, Zhou (2007) finds that compensations incurred by a 
county government in Zhejiang Province accounted for an extremely tiny fraction, 
1.59%, of the selling price. Even after paying various fees to the relevant government 
departments, total costs of land conversion only made up 4.75% of overall land 
conversion revenues. And in the less lucrative instance of residential and mixed 
                                                 
12 Statistics show that farmland decreased by as much as 120 million mu (1 mu=0.0667 hectare) 
between 1996 and 2005 or 6.6% of the total arable land (Ministry of Land and Resources, 2006).  
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(commercial and residential) usages the pertinent percentages accounted for only 
13.84 and 9.16, leaving colossal profits to be reaped by the municipal government. 
Similarly, Zhou Qiren (2004) has also shown that in selling one mu of arable land the 
township government of Maichen in Xuwen County in Guangdong Province had to 
paid only 40,000 yuan, which, when set against the average selling price of 0.88 
million yuan per mu the township government there could easily cover the cost from 
selling only four mu of land; the Maichen township government sold 90 mu of land in 
this instance and made a windfall profit. 
 
Small wonder regional governments have increasingly turned to auctioning land 
usufruct rights to commercial and real estate usages instead of either industrial (in the 
form of “development zones” or kaifaqu) or public welfare projects (gongyi shiye 
xiangmu) such as roads and highway construction, schools and hospitals, etc.; the 
latter a trend up until the mid-1990s (Lin and Ho, 2005: 424). Regional governments’ 
waning interest in allocating land to public welfare projects can be easily explained by 
the fact that land is typically provided for free in such instances. Moreover, regional 
governments have to provide subsidies typically required in developing land for these 
projects. And while industrial usage is in principle also a revenue generator, fierce 
competition among localities could easily drive prices down (Q. Zhou, 2004), to a 
point where villagers became so upset with the township government for having 
charged an unconvincingly low price that they suspected the local officials of 
corruption. Some villagers were so angry that they even robbed the cadres’ houses 
(Ming Pao, 2007, May 8 and 11, A29). Once again, Zhou’s (2007) study of the three 
municipalities/counties in Zhejiang Province demonstrates this point most clearly. 
Whereas the average price of industrial land varied only narrowly between 12,000 and 
15,000 yuan per mu between 1999 and 2003, the lowest commercial price was 34,000 
yuan in 2001 and a whopping 182,000 yuan the year after.  
 The hefty prices that premier locations fetch is however not balanced by the 
appallingly low compensation that farmers receive in relinquishing their land. As we 
shall explain in further detail in the next section, apart from exceeding the quotas set 
by the state and the delays in compensating farmers overall low compensation is 
actually part and parcel of the institutional design and is thus not illegal. The Land 
Management Law of 1986, which spells out in detail the exact compensation to be 
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paid to farmers in the event of land conversion, is essentially premised on the 
agricultural value of land, whereas the sale price of the converted land is determined 
by non-agricultural value, between which lies a colossal gap in monetary value 
(especially where land is converted for real estate development). In other words, as 
long as local governments convert land within the limits set by the central government 
and compensate the farmers according to legal stipulations, which is set at 6-10 times 
the average crop yield of the previous three years, plus a resettlement allowance set at 
4-6 times the average yield of the previous three years, and lastly a locally determined 
crop compensation fee, land conversion conducted in accordance with these 
stipulations is by no means illegal. Indeed, local governments are assigned the rights 
to retain the profits from land conversion and are expected to deploy them rationally 
to developing the local economy. 
 
Land Conversion: Low Compensation a Violation of Farmers’ Property Rights?  
 
 The extraordinarily strong incentives of local governments to boost fiscal 
revenues have far reaching consequences both for China’s arable resources and state-
peasant relationships with regard to competition over these scarce resources. 
Although the state has officially set quotas on land conversion, local governments 
have strong incentives to circumvent the law. For instance, of the 837 appeal letters 
received by the central government in 2003 concerning land issues, fully 55% was 
related to illegal land expropriation and occupation of collective land (Institute of 
Rural Development Research, Chinese Academy of Social Science, 2003: 14).13 This 
finding is consistent with the evidence that unauthorized conversion increased in 2003 
amidst the decline in authorized conversion (Figure 5). Although it receded in 2004, 
by 2006 the Ministry of Land and Resources was still forced to issue an urgent 
circular to local officials who approved new land acquisitions without authorization 
from the central government. The circular warned them gravely of the possible 
consequences of party disciplinary sanctions, and also called upon the supervisory 
ministry to ensure better enforcement in the crackdown. In light of the trend that an 
average 200,000 hectares of farmland had been converted annually into non-arable 
usage (Chen Xiwen, cited in Wang, Hongru, 2006: 3), in 2007 China’s premier Wen 
                                                 
13 The next major reason, which accounted for 23%, pertains to compensation being “too low or 
misappropriated”. 
 18
Jiabo warned gravely that China must rigorously protect its arable resources as it 
could ill afford to fall below the minimum threshold of 1.2 million square kilometers 
of arable land required for food self-sufficiency.  
 
Even more seriously, as unauthorized land conversions often involved forced 
evictions of farmers off their land and homes, inadequate compensation, deferred 
payments or downright embezzlement, they threatened social stability. Indeed, the 
“land issue” (tudi wenti) topped the list of the three key major agrarian issues 
(sannong wenti)—accounting for 68.7% of all responses according to a CCTV 
telephone survey conducted in 2004. It is also not surprising that violent conflicts 
between villagers and local police over land disputes had repeatedly occurred since 
the early 2000s, with county and municipal governments being notable villains (Yu, 
2005).  
 
 To better understand the nature of property rights in land in the Chinese 
context it is necessary to invoke a little bit of history here. In a nutshell, de jure 
private ownership in land with respect to the bundle of use, income and transfer right 
has ceased to exist in China after the Communist Party came to power in 1949 and 
collectivized agriculture in successive stages in the mid-to-late 1950s. Since 
decollectivizing its agriculture in the early 1980s, use and income rights have been 
reassigned to the farm households through land leasing contracts which they signed 
with the village authorities (cun jiti). Neither the right to alter the land’s usage nor to 
transfer it to another party was conferred to the farmers, however. This crucial right to 
transfer the foregoing bundles of rights has remained firmly in the hands of the state 
and in part of the village authorities. But as an increasing number of farmers leave for 
long distance off-farm employment opportunities, it becomes apparent that it is 
necessary for the state to relax the grip placed upon farmers from transferring their 
use and income rights in land—at least temporarily.   
 
It is in this evolving context of development that the state further extended 
farmers’ rights by allowing them to temporarily transfer their use rights or simply 
renting. According to the new Rural Land Contracting Law (Nongcun tudi 
chengbaofa), enacted in 2002, farm households are allowed to sublease their land to 
other farm households. To ensure that farmers are able to enjoy this limited transfer 
right, the state has even gone so far as to prohibit the village authorities, the nominal 
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owner, from periodically reallocating land among farm households in response to 
demographic change—a customary practice embedded in the collective ownership 
nature of China’s arable land. Unfortunately, this protection of farmers’ transfer right 
is confined to only arable land use; once land is converted to non-arable usage the 
statutory power of the Rural Land Contracting Law ceases to apply.  
 
 In fact, nationalization has been the only legal mechanism by which farmland, 
which is de jure collectively-owned, can be converted into non-arable usages. 
According to Article 63 of the Land Management Law of 1999, the legal statuses 
governing land conversion, farmers do not possess the right to convert arable land into 
non-arable usage; only the (nominal) owner, viz. the local authorities, are empowered 
to do so. Moreover, any non-arable usage of collective farmland requires a 
corresponding change in ownership—specifically from collective to state ownership 
(Article 43).  Apart from the minimal compensation stipulated by the state and which 
therefore is liable to legal protection, China’s farmers are thus subject totally to the 
whims of local authorities in the process of land conversion. As mentioned earlier, 
even in the best-case scenario where local governments observe the quota limits of 
land conversion and abide by the procedures of compensation, the massive hiatus 
between the “windfall profits” resulting from selling the farmland for commercial and 
real estate development on the one hand and the measly compensation made to 
farmers on the other has created an enormous sense of injustice from the latter’s point 
of view. 
 
In the process of land conversion local authorities have triggered serious 
conflicts with the farmers, who feel that they have been robbed of the bundle of rights 
assigned to them at the outset of the reform. From this vantage point it is thus ironical 
that, while the state has legislated to protect farmers’ use rights by prohibiting local 
authorities from periodically reallocating land, it accords the same authorities the 
monopoly right to grab land away from the village community with only minimal 
compensation. Although they are nominally “members” of the village collective, 
farmers are basically unable to defend their collectively-held land rights against the 
local authorities. With this power bestowed upon them and, more specifically, with a 
clearly defined compensation formulae stipulated by the central state, many local 
authorities simply find it unnecessary to negotiate with the peasants for a fair 
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compensation; the major binding constraint in determining compensation appears to 
be the threshold value of avoiding social unrest. Thus, although local authorities are 
supposed to act in the interests of the farmers, in particular in guarding their collective 
land rights, more often than not they have turned out to be robbers of valuable 
communal resources.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 China’s sustained economic growth since 1978 has occurred in a highly 
decentralized context of “yardstick competition” among regions facing similar 
external conditions. While the initial decentralization-based reform led to phenomenal 
success of industrial growth (in the form of TVEs) in many regions, the reassignment 
of fiscal rights over various tax categories and revenues have subsequently induced 
some local governments to focus disproportionately on “urbanization.”  The key 
impetus behind this drive for “urbanization” lies in the conversion of farmland into 
commercial usage, and the construction and real estate sectors associated therewith. 
The exclusive income and monopoly rights of local authorities over land conversion 
have powerfully predisposed them to maximize their fiscal coffers at the expense of 
farmers’ rights in agricultural land. However, the legal rights with which local 
officials have been assigned and the biased incentives embedded in these rights have 
led to ever worsening social conflicts. To arrest these adverse tendencies the central 
government has endeavored both to cramp down on land conversion and development 
and to acquiesce the growing rural social unrest. However, a thorough solution would 
require more than mere piecemeal attempts to contain these problems; just as previous 
reforms, further reforms down the road of transition and growth similarly require a 
reconfiguration of existing institutions and their attendant property rights structure. 
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Figure 1: Central and Local Governments’ Budgetary Revenues, 1978-2006 
 
 
 
Source: A Compendium of Statistics for the 55 Years of New China, 1949-2004 
(Xinzhongguo Wushiwu Nian Tongji Ziliao Huibian). Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji 
Chubanshe, 2005. 
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Figure 2: Share of Construction and Real Estate Sectors in Business Tax, 
2001-2004 
 
 
  
Source: The Taxation Yearbook of China, 2005 (Zhongguo Shuiwu Nianjian). Beijing: 
Zhongguo Shuiwu Chubanshe. 
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Figure 3: Profits from Land Revenue in S County, Zhejiang Province, 2003 
(Million Yuan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: CRE = Construction and Real Estate  
          % of budgetary revenue;  
          % of “extra-budgetary” revenue;  
          %* of “non-budgetary” revenue. 
 
 
 
 Source: Zhou (2007). 
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Figure 4: Incidence and Magnitude of Land Conversion, 1993-2005 
 
 
Sources: 
The Land Yearbook of China, 1995-1997 (Zhongguo Tudi Nianjian, 1995-1997). 
Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe.  
The Land Resource Yearbook of China, 1999-2006 (Zhongguo Guotu Ziyuan 
Nianjian, 1996-2006). Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe. 
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Figure 5: Unauthorized Land Conversion: Incidence and Magnitude, 
1993-2005 
 
  
Sources: 
The Land Yearbook of China, 1995-1997 (Zhongguo Tudi Nianjian, 1995-1997). 
Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe.  
The Land Resource Yearbook of China, 1999-2006 (Zhongguo Guotu Ziyuan 
Nianjian, 1996-2006). Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe. 
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